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Abstract 
This article is based on a historical-comparative policy and discourse analysis of the principles 
underpinning the Australian disability income support system. It determines that these principles rely on a 
conception of disability that sustains a system of coercion and paternalism that perpetuates disability; this 
is referred to as disablism. The report examines the construction of disability in Australian income support 
across four major historical epochs spanning the period 1908–2007. Contextualisation of the policy 
trajectory and discourses of the contemporary disability pension regime for the time period 2008–now is 
also provided. The system was found to have perpetuated disablism through the generation of disability 
categories on the basis of normalcy and ableness as a condition of citizenship. Two major themes were 
found to have interacted with the ideology of disablism. The first theme – Commonwealth authority – set 
the tone for legitimising the regulation of disabled citizens. The second theme – conservative sanctioned 
paternalism and coercion – reflected the tensions between the paternalistic concern for income support 
provision while attempting to prevent idleness and welfare dependency. This article argues that a non-
disabling provision based on social citizenship, rather than responsible or productive citizenship, counters 
the tendency for authoritarian and paternal approaches. 
Keywords: Australia, citizenship, disability policy, income support, discourse 
 
Introduction: painting a picture of the disability policy landscape 
This article draws on historical-comparative policy and discourse research to provide an account of the 
enduring nature of principles that marginalise recipients and perpetuate incapacity – referred to here as 
‘disabling principles’ – underpinning the Australian disability income support system spanning the years 
1908–2007 and 2008–now. Contemporary western industrial societies, such as Australia, have pursued 
income support policies based on a range of welfare regime types framed in terms of their welfare 
arrangements and ideological positions (Schröder 2009). For Australia, the disability income support 
system is situated within the broader political economy of the welfare state and reflects a liberal regime 
that is residualist, non-contributory, and conducive to needs-based entitlement. 
Historically, the first Australian disability income support statutory provision for people with a disability 
was the Commonwealth Invalid and Old-Age Pensions Act, introduced and enacted in 1908 (Bessant et al. 
2006). Australia was one of the first countries to introduce a nationwide government-funded income 
support system for social protection (Dixon & Hyde 2000). Today, the disability pension is a targeted 
payment, set at a flat rate and subject to means-testing and other eligibility criteria (Bessant et al. 2006). 
During the past four decades, industrialised countries including Australia have pursued reforms targeting 
social security arrangements and labour market programs as a means to manage rapidly changing global 
economic conditions and poverty (Drakeford & Davidson 2013; Soldatic & Pini 2013). The changes have 
potential consequences for people with a disability in terms of their social citizenship (Oliver 2009). 
In this article, the emphasis on social protection measures centres on the understanding that welfare policy 
is a powerful tool that can influence and shape ideology and marginalise the very vulnerable people that 
the policies are supposed to support (Bessant et al. 2006). Historically, people with a disability have been 
‘objects of policy’ through policy language and processes of income support and disability service 
systems. 
On the global level there is a growing body of literature (Grover & Piggott 2010) related to the relationship 
between the disability concept and social policy. Some global and national comparative exploration of 
  
welfare state arrangements and income support provision has been undertaken (see Priestley et al. 2010; 
Parker Harris et al. 2012; Weston 2012). Although highly useful for understanding welfare arrangements 
and disability policy, these studies are limited to a descriptive account of legislative, policy and 
programmatic developments. Where attention has been paid to ideology, the studies remain highly 
contextualised and within narrow time periods. 
On the national level, other research studies have similarly traced some historical developments of 
Australian income support or disability policy (for example, Tulloch 1979; Parker & Cass 2005; Humpage 
2007; Soldatic & Pini 2013). Yet, few studies have spanned a 100-year timeframe (the notable exception is 
Kewley 1980) to explicate the historical and ideological assumptions that function to impact on people 
with disabilities. 
This article traces the continuities and discontinuities of disability income support policy development and 
pathways across the time period 1908–2007 and the contemporary context 2008–now to examine the 
historical and ideological dimensions that shaped the Australian disability pension regime. The article 
provides new insights into the way Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism 
interacts with disablism and functions to perpetuate disabling categories over time. Commonwealth 
authority represents the power of the government to intervene and control people with a disability through 
legislation and administrative practices. Commonwealth authority discourse operates in conjunction with 
conservative sanctioned paternalism to portray the government as the omnipotent body that will look after 
people with disabilities (Schröder 2009). Conservative sanctioned paternalism relates to the government’s 
benevolent authority and paternalism in assuming the government is acting in the best interests of welfare 
recipients, such as notions of whether a recipient is deserving/undeserving in the provision of disability 
income support (Schröder 2009). Conservative sanctioned paternalism is depicted in the oft-repeated 
ministerial statements ‘we assist everybody in need’ and ‘they [the government] know what is good for 
welfare recipients’ (Goodin 2001; Fairclough 2009). 
Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism function with the ideology of disablism 
to control the behaviour of people with a disability. The ideology of disablism is a form of hegemony. 
Disablism is the consequence of disability as oppression, whereby negative attitudes, disablist policies, 
discriminatory practices and environmental barriers prevent the full participation and inclusion of people 
with disabilities in everyday society (Oliver 2009). This article argues that a non-disabling provision based 
on social citizenship, rather than productive citizenship, counters the tendency for authoritative and 
paternal approaches. Social citizenship is used as an inclusive concept to denote an egalitarian society that 
promotes the achievement of social, civil, political and human rights, and social inclusion and participation 
of people with a disability in all aspects of life (Oliver 2009). 
Historical-comparative policy research for analysing disability income support 
Critical historical-comparative policy research is used to unpack historical and ideological patterns within 
and across differing time periods and disability pension regimes. Critical discourse analysis provides the 
method for analysing the language and ideology of disability income support processes – production and 
legitimation – and texts within Australian political economy and policy (Fairclough 2009; Reisigl & 
Wodak 2009). 
In a similar vein to P. Harris (2001), J. Harris (2008) and Soldatic and Pini (2013), this article attempts to 
capture significant moments in time such as continuities and discontinuities and similarities and 
divergences of the disability pension regime across differing epochs to analyse the ideological shifts and 
complex social, political, cultural and economic trends that shape conceptions of disability (J. Harris 
2008). Four major historical eras were chosen on the basis that each era reflected a snapshot in time 
underpinned by a particular policy, administrative or legal change, and paradigm shift significant to 
disability income support policy (P. Harris 2001; J. Harris 2008). The original broad epochs and key 
themes incorporate: epoch one (1908–1940), ‘invalid citizen’ and productive citizenship discourse: 
enactment and implementation of the Invalid Pension; epoch two (1941–1985), Invalid Pension moral 
transition: from inferred right to moral right to fraud and malingering; epoch three (1986–1995) a 
‘liberalising’ change: activ[e]ating the Disability Support Pension and the emergence of active citizenship 
discourse; epoch four (1996–2007), the capable regulated and contributing citizen: a shift from invalid 
  
citizen, genuinely unemployed and active citizen discourses; and contemporary policy trajectory (2008–
now), partial incapacity, active participation, and job-ready discourse. 
For the purpose of this analysis, a narrow selection of disability specific policy documents (parliamentary 
Hansard, legislation, public service instructions manual, government commissioned policy reports, and 
parliamentary press releases) which framed policy debate at the time is presented. For example, 
Commonwealth Government (Hansard), Heathershaw (1935), Cass Review (1988), Howard (1999; 2006), 
Newman (2000), Gillard (2011), Andrews (2014). In addition, several political cartoons were chosen on 
the basis of each document’s degree of authority, authenticity, credibility, accessibility and function, 
together with the specific time period, specific political actors, and specific policy fields (Fairclough 2009; 
Reisigl & Wodak 2009). In order to guide policy text selection, these selection sampling criteria (for 
example, authority) drawn from Fairclough (2009) and Reisigl and Wodak (2009) were used in 
conjunction with the specific epochs and textual domain areas of public policy, dominant mainstream 
media and alternative public discourses. This strategy increased the trustworthiness in the identification 
and selection of data sources. From here, Lemke’s (1995) principle of ‘intertextuality’ was applied to 
support data dependability. Intertextuality refers to reading public policy texts alongside other texts such as 
alternative public discourse texts to gain an understanding of multiple voices and prevent privileging 
official documents as the only authentic and authoritative data source (Lemke 1995). For example, in 
epoch three, the Cass Review (1988) functioned as a seminal policy text that shaped and influenced the 
policy direction of the Labor Government (see the parliamentary speeches of Brian Howe, then Minister 
for Social Services, Commonwealth of Australia 1989). 
Applying Fairclough’s (2009) and Reisigl and Wodak’s (2009) approach to critical discourse analysis 
assisted in identifying the meanings ascribed to texts, and the ideological work of texts in shaping social 
reality across time. The approach involved exploring the social relations of power and ideology relative to 
the emergence, constitution and reconstitution of discourses (dialectical relations of texts), rhetorical 
devices (specific discourses with an ideological function designed to persuade the population about the 
value of certain ideas and sell policy positions), discursive formations and their ordering in the text 
(semiotics containing genres, discourses and style) and properties of discourses (signifiers and empty 
signifiers that are used to transmit meanings and legitimate particular constructions of social reality as 
natural and commonsense) found in policy documents (Fairclough 2009; Reisigl & Wodak 2009). 
A backdrop to tracing the history 1908–2007 and 2008–now 
For much of its history, Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism and coercion 
operated in conjunction to perpetuate and entrench the ideology of disablism through disability income 
support legislative and administrative frameworks. The policy trajectory showed that there is a continuity 
of themes including notions of incentives, productivity, and dependency throughout the four epochs. 
Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism were represented in the authoritative 
framework for regulating disabled citizens through legislation, policy speeches, eligibility requirements, 
and a paternalistic concern for income support provision while attempting to prevent idleness. Although 
the disability income support system was intended to be an enabling policy, the way it has been 
constructed results in it being disabling. This is the ideology of disablism. 
Epoch one (1908–1940) ‘invalid citizen’ and productive citizenship discourse: 
enactment and implementation of the Invalid Pension 
Between 1908 and 1940, the new powers afforded to the Commonwealth via Federation, along with the 
Invalid Pension legislation, gave rise to a new Commonwealth authority with new powers by which the 
Commonwealth could intervene in the lives of people with a disability. The vision held by political figures 
of the time – such as Labor Prime Ministers Andrew Fisher and James Scullin – formed the initial concrete 
response to the Invalid Pension that was to endure until the present day. Although both the Invalid and 
Old-Age Pensions were needs-based entitlements, there existed a fundamental distinction between each 
pension. Older persons were afforded naturalised rights and entitlements based on perceived earned rights 
and contribution to society, that is, upon how deserving of a pension a recipient is; whereas for people with 
disability the newly formed relationship between the Commonwealth and people with a disability was 
regulatory (Commonwealth of Australia 1908a: 11922; 1908b; 1908c). Commonwealth authority 
manifested in the legislative framework of the Invalid Pension 1908 and was enacted through regulatory 
  
controls embedded in the eligibility criteria. The Invalid Pension was provided only on the basis of 
measures of disability and criteria of permanent functional deficiencies (Fairclough 2009). For example, 
the following extract from the original legislation reveals the enshrinement of the right to an Invalid 
Pension, based on the criterion ‘permanently incapacitated for work’ as the principal statutory requirement 
for eligibility: 
Part IV s20. Every person above the age of sixteen years who is permanently incapacitated 
for work, by reason of an accident or by reason of his being an invalid, and who is not 
receiving an old-age pension, shall whilst in Australia, be qualified to receive an invalid 
pension (Commonwealth of Australia 1908d: 131–132). 
In enabling control through eligibility criteria, the Commonwealth employs a form of bureaucratic 
centralism in legislating the requirements for obtaining an Invalid Pension and administering practices in 
the assessment for ‘invalidism’ by medical practitioners (Commonwealth of Australia 1908a; 1908b; 
1908c; 1908d; Kewley 1980; Fairclough 2009). Bureaucratic centralism is a product of the dominant, 
centralised management and control of administrative practices by the bureaucracy in setting the 
precedence for disability income support eligibility. Bureaucratic centralism is used in eligibility 
determinations in which eligibility is considered against impairment levels and in part against other 
environmental features – for example, consideration of the economic climate – rather than social factors 
(Glassman 2013). The clause reveals the concern for categorical eligibility and medical criteria rather than 
social definitions in constructing invalidity and disability as the central requirements and absolute 
measures for receiving an Invalid Pension. The enacting legislation and administrative practices are 
dialectically connected to the ideology of able-bodied normalcy. Ableness is constructed as the norm and 
afforded privileged status, whereas invalidism and permanent incapacity is a product of individual-
functional, charity and medical models and constructed in terms of deficiency (Oliver 2009). Invalidism 
and permanent incapacity thus become measured against productive capacity. People with a disability were 
classified according to their impairment, individual attributes and perceived personal deficiencies given the 
reliance on categorical eligibility (Oliver 2009). 
This naturalising strategy is not an unusual practice. Centred on a close connection to the labour market 
and considerations of capacity, the Invalid Pension was situated in the context of the Commonwealth and 
capitalist political economy. This contextualisation generated connections to the market and productive 
citizenship, rather than social citizenship. It further operated as a means for political parties to garner 
support and alliance from the general population (Fairclough 2009). 
Conservative sanctioned paternalism and coercion was manifest in conservative mistrust enacted through 
deterrent clauses defining provision of the Invalid Pension, whereby the pension was presumed to be a 
supplement to other forms of income. Conservative mistrust was based on the concern expressed by 
political leaders that the Invalid Pension could perpetuate recipient malingering and idleness (see 
parliamentary debates in Commonwealth of Australia 1908a; 1908b). In part, this suspicion derived from 
the perception that the payment was overly generous (maximum £26 per annum/10 shillings per week), 
and belief in the propensity for people with a disability to take advantage of the payment (Commonwealth 
of Australia 1908a; 1908b; 1908c; 1908d). The perception was that setting the payment amount well below 
the average wage functioned in part as an incentive for people with a disability to seek work and not 
remain idle on the Invalid Pension. In an early 1908 parliamentary debate, Liberal Protectionist Attorney-
General Sir Littleton E. Groom provided a moral justification for conservative sanctioned paternalism, 
seen in the phrase:  
[The proposed payment is] liberal … and just (Commonwealth of Australia 1908a: 11922). 
The rhetorical device found in the above phrase – an appeal to moral authority – provided the impetus and 
justification for incentives and inferences around productive citizenship. 
Several moral requirements underpinning the Invalid Pension – such as the stipulation that a recipient must 
be an Australian resident and of good moral character – contained additional exclusionary clauses 
prohibiting particular groups such as ‘Aliens’, Asiatics’, and Aboriginal people. Suspension of the 
payment ensued for people entering an asylum or institution, people with criminal convictions, people 
convicted of disorderly conduct due to alcoholism and people who deserted their families (Commonwealth 
  
of Australia 1908d: 17). Such discursive formations assumed moral justification for maintaining tight 
eligibility requirements. Another moral requirement similarly constructed eligibility criteria in terms of 
worthiness in order to receive the pension, for example, ‘[that the] claimant be deserving of a pension’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1908d: 9) and refusal on the ground of character: 
Part IV s22(d). No person shall receive an invalid pension unless-(d.) the accident or 
invalid state of health was not self-induced, nor in any way brought about with a view to 
obtaining a pension (Commonwealth of Australia 1908d: 131–132). 
The use of these phrases targeting individual behaviours seek to function as deterrents and reflect the way 
paternalism and the sanctioning of behaviour interacted with and reinforced Commonwealth authority. 
Similar phrasing in a later government policy document (1935) ensured the continuity of the principles 
supporting conservative sanctioned paternalism and their associated moral requirements: 
It is considered undesirable to grant pensions to persons who … solicit contributions in the 
streets …. If the claimant undertakes to … give up street begging, a pension may be 
granted (Heathershaw 1935: 20, emphasis in original). 
The moral bases in these provisions are very much those of the English Poor Laws and the Statute of 
Labourers 1348, which defined people in terms of their capacity to participate in the labour market and by 
reference to notions of deserving and undeserving poor, thereby establishing behavioural conditions and 
expectations around being a good productive citizen (Ashley 1893). 
Figure 1 below encapsulates many of the signifiers used to justify conservative sanctioned paternalism in 
the application of moral eligibility criteria. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Here the legislation presents conservative sanctioned paternalism and its moral prerequisites as logical and 
appropriate, based on a categorisation of normalcy designed to determine the moral code surrounding who 
is deserving of the Invalid Pension. Thus, implicit within this category is the generation of boundaries 
concerning what is considered appropriate moral standards of behaviour (Oliver 2009). Few political 
leaders during epoch one disputed the assumption that the Invalid Pension was a charity measure (see 
Commonwealth of Australia 1908a; 1908b; 1908c; Kewley 1980: 11). This type of bureaucratic 
centralism, which drove the legislative framework and its administrative practices, over time led to the 
endurance of Commonwealth authority, conservative sanctioned paternalism, and productive citizenship. 
Epoch two (1941–1985) Invalid Pension moral transition: from inferred right to moral 
right to fraud and malingering 
The first part of epoch two is characterised by the expansion of the world’s most comprehensive system of 
means-tested income support systems between 1940 and 1970 (Kewley 1980). This period included a 
policy of economic restructuring and social redevelopment, evident during the Labor Government reign 
from 1941 to 1950 with the introduction of the ‘fair go’ principle. In this epoch, a fair go reflected an 
egalitarian – fair and equitable – approach to the distribution of disability income support by means of the 
newly formed Social Security Act (1947) (Kewley 1980). As a purportedly egalitarian approach, disability 
income support was expected to be a right of entitlement, rather than based on charitable or deserving poor 
ideals (Oliver 2009). The shift in discourses was designed to enshrine basic rights and move away from 
connotations of disability income support in terms of regulatory control, paternalism and deserving poor. 
Yet, even with the notion of a fair go introduced into parliamentary speeches, the discursive themes of 
Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism remained constant in terms of 
maintaining the invalid citizen construction. This period saw only minor changes to the Invalid Pension 
provisions in 1941 and 1947 (Kewley 1980). In the late 1970s, a notable discontinuity in the Australian 
political economy impacted on the disability pension regime. Pursuing the policy trajectory of epoch two – 
namely, emphasising individual rights while practising sanctioned paternalism – enabled development in 
the 1970s of a restricted welfare policy approach based on neoliberalism. Achieved by means of social and 
economic constraint, it represented a marked divergence from early expansionist policies of 1940s–1970. 
  
In the early parts of epoch two (1940s), there were difficulties associated with measuring impairment and 
medical factors while incorporating the assessment of different socio-economic conditions such as 
individual characteristics, prior work history, and availability of work. Although continuity in the early 
part of this epoch centred on the eligibility criterion of a person being permanently incapacitated for work, 
there was an attempt to seek uniformity of decision-making and clarity in determinations. This process led 
to minor changes in the Invalid Pension eligibility criteria and administrative practices in 1940-41 and 
1947 (Kewley 1980). 
Between 1940 and 1941 a minor change saw implementation of the 15 percentile ruling to clarify 
permanently incapacitated status (Commonwealth of Australia 1941, Invalid & Old-Age Pension Act 
1908, No. 48, 3(s4)(2)). A further change in eligibility criteria occurred in 1947: 
A person shall be deemed to be permanently incapacitated for work if the degree of his 
permanent incapacity for work is not less than eighty-five per centum (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1947, Div 3 s23: 205). 
In this, the 85 per cent incapacity measurement represented the discursive theme of securing increasing 
control through modifying Invalid Pension eligibility criteria. This process reinforces the ideology of 
normalcy whereby the use of scientific standards based on deficit in eligibility determinations is closely 
connected to social control and regulation of the invalid citizen (Oliver 2009: 37). The practice continued 
throughout epoch two. However, the complexity involved in measuring impairment and quantifying the 
ruling was problematic given the wide variations in impairment and the potential for moral judgements by 
medical referees, that is, sanctioned paternalism (Kewley 1980). 
Although the 85 per cent ruling was designed to provide guidance in assessment, throughout epoch two 
and until the 1970s the tendency in granting the pension was to err on the side of generosity and take 
account of labour market conditions (Kewley 1980). The approach was presented as natural and 
commonsense as a means to seek support for a coherent approach to eligibility assessment. Thus, 
accounting for the changing nature of the labour market influenced determinations for eligibility and led to 
increased numbers in receipt of the Invalid Pension. However, broader changes to the labour market – 
especially during the 1950s and 1960s – meant greater difficulties for people with a disability being able to 
access employment. A discourse of providing the Invalid Pension to only the most needy citizens emerged 
(Kewley 1980), reinforcing paternalistic assumptions that the invalid citizen is not to be trusted, and 
therefore requires greater regulation by the Government. 
It is the latter parts of epoch two that represented a significant divergence in the policy trajectory. During 
the early parts of the 1970s, the Labor Government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (1972–75) 
sought reinterpretation of Commonwealth authority through a policy platform that enhanced the social 
rights of all people. The Whitlam Government attempted to transform policy principles from liberal 
assumptions of most needy to social democratic principles of citizens’ rights. This is seen in a 
parliamentary speech concerning the Social Welfare Commission Bill 1973 (Cth) by the then Minister for 
Social Security (1973): 
[The policy focus on] adequate welfare systems as … a public right … contributes to the 
well-being of the total Australian community. This new philosophy demands a change of 
emphasis in government policy and welfare programs (Commonwealth of Australia 1973: 
1237). 
However, the enduring conservative principles underpinning the Invalid Pension remained in place. The 
notion of public rights became narrowly prescribed rights as people with a disability were expected to 
share ‘community rights’ and participate in society (Fairclough 2009). The narrowly prescribed rights for 
people with a disability were contained within the context of the existing traditional disability income 
support policy and welfare programs, which ensured the perpetuation of Commonwealth authority and 
sanctioned paternalism. 
The subsequent period under Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser’s Government (1975–80) signified 
another major shift in policy. This shift, driven by an era of economic and political instability – high rates 
  
of unemployment, high inflation, and high costs associated with the disability pension regime – is seen in 
the increasingly heavy targeting of income support. 
The first part of a parliamentary speech by the then Governor-General in 1976 typifies the rhetoric used in 
exploiting fear to cement the argument for minimalist government intervention and tightening welfare 
assistance: 
Government [has] a strong directive to bring under control the highest unemployment for 
forty years and the worst prolonged inflation in the nation's history … [and] that excessive 
government intervention in the life of the nation is a major factor in economic instability 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1976: 12). 
This discursive formation reflects a government policy centred on restricting public expenditure and 
targeting the genuinely needy. The old form of Commonwealth authority and sanctioned paternalism is 
replaced with a new interpretation of bureaucratic centralism. The focus for the government was on 
controlling inflation while maintaining incentives for work and reducing welfare expenditure 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1976: 12). The concept of nationhood is used to gain approval from the 
general public to progress with a minimalist governmental approach (Fairclough 2009). Neoliberalism 
provided the ideological platform for legitimising targeted measures and a minimalist government: 
Government’s immediate objective is to bring inflation under control so that there can 
again be jobs for all who want to work … [and] prevent the growth of centralised 
bureaucratic domination in Australia, the increasing dependence of individuals on the state 
… in which people have maximum freedom and independence to achieve their own goals 
in life, in ways which they decide (Commonwealth of Australia 1976: 12). 
The above clause attempts to divert attention from the impact of socio-economic conditions and 
government responsibility in an effort by government to blame individuals for their situation. Discursive 
diversionary tactics of this type constitute a significant component of the dialectal relations of legislation, 
policy texts and practices directed at preventing individual dependency on the state (Oliver 2009). 
These discursive frames have constituted a powerful mechanism with which to shift perceptions and gain 
alliances with the general population, as the next clause demonstrates: 
As part of this approach the Government will place great emphasis on directing welfare 
assistance to those in real need. Unless there is a concentration on those in real need, 
schemes of assistance do not provide maximum possible assistance to the disadvantaged 
and become excessively costly. The Government does not believe that the poor and 
disadvantaged can be helped by increasing the dependence of everyone on what the 
Government chooses to provide (Commonwealth of Australia 1976: 12). 
The assumption here is that without cost containment of welfare expenditure and tighter targeting there 
will be high costs and detrimental impacts on the community. In constructing the the role of government as 
that of the responsible accountant – responding to the problem of burgeoning welfare costs for the 
community and welfare dependency – the Governor-General affirms the role of government in embedding 
the notions of minimalism, independence, and decentralisation. The assumption generated is that jobs will 
be available to those persons who demonstrate a desire to work. Using this logic, and given the criterion of 
being permanently incapacitated for work, only genuinely needy people with a disability would receive the 
Invalid Pension. This made the disability pension regime disabling in nature as – paradoxically – the call 
for minimalist government intervention perpetuated greater controls and regulation of the invalid citizen. 
Figure 2 below reveals the regulatory aspects of ‘real need’ and ‘genuinely looking for work’ discourses 
contained within neoliberal political economy. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
This cartoon comments on the rhetoric of government whereby the policy target is those people considered 
‘genuinely looking for work’. In this epoch, such rhetoric is used to promote distance between those who 
contribute and those who don’t contribute to the workforce. This image is juxtaposed with the disincentive 
argument found in the phrase ‘preventing welfare dependency’ and the rhetoric of self-reliance, whereby 
  
idleness is to be prevented. The dole is synonymous with welfare payments, inclusive of the Invalid 
Pension, which at the time was also subject to criticism  that it was open to fraud (see parliamentary 
debates Commonwealth of Australia 1976). In order to qualify for a pension, people with a disability 
needed to be considered deserving of a pension – this constituted conservative sanctioned paternalism. The 
inference was that potential recipients were disinclined to work if offered unfettered access to the Invalid 
Pension. In epoch two, the increasing regulatory controls established the presumption that people with a 
disability were unworthy and defective in relation to the disability pension regime, which was established 
as decent and reputable for those who deserve to receive such an entitlement. 
Epoch three (1986–1995) a ‘liberalising’ change: activ[e]ating the Disability Support 
Pension and the emergence of active citizenship discourse 
Epoch three witnessed further significant change driven by broad socio-historical conditions – Labor 
Governments under Prime Ministers Bob Hawke and then Paul Keating naturalised particular principles 
defining the nature of the Australian disability income support system (Fairclough 2009). The government 
rearticulated the meaning of the disability pension in an attempt to balance rapid global socio-economic 
change while subscribing to socio-economic ideals. This reflected a newly transformed hegemonic project 
even where there was continuity of existing incentive and productivity assumptions (Fairclough 2009). 
During this epoch, Commonwealth authority was discursively reconstituted under the pretext of a social 
justice strategy – the signifier ‘social justice’ being devoid of fixed meaning and allowing easy policy 
reconstitution – and a ‘fair go’ for disability income support policy, which denoted meaning established 
during the Curtin and Chifley Labor governments of the 1940s. The historic Invalid Pension was perceived 
to be a disincentive to work, hence the shift away from entitlement with conditions and workforce capacity 
to proving capacity and active citizenship. Figure 3 below portrays the broader economic conditions 
shaping the political economy of the disability pension regime and the paradox of the fair go vision. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The new vision of a fair go and social justice was purported to establish credibility and a reconstituted 
Commonwealth authority. For legitimacy and greater acceptance of the policy change to be attained, the 
government used the notions of a fair go and social justice to sell the shared idea of a liberalised disability 
income support system. This is evident in parliamentary debate (Commonwealth of Australia 1987) and 
reflected in the following parliamentary speech: 
As we move into the 1990s, the challenge is for all Australians to shed their prejudices and 
change their restricted thinking so that we can share a vision which will provide real 
choices for people with disabilities …. We are at another important milestone on the road 
towards a new system (Commonwealth of Australia 1989: 3264). 
Here, the Government is presented as inclusive and authoritative. Commonwealth authority is legitimised 
primarily by reference to inclusivity (‘we’; ‘share’), establishing governmental authority to enact 
regulatory and economic change (Fairclough 2009). In this epoch, the dominant formations of shared 
vision and real choices secure Commonwealth authority by constructing a unified and just national identity 
necessary for the transformation of disability income support policy. This discursive formation reflects the 
emergence and constitution of a new ‘unified’ world view in which the reader is asked to become a part of 
the change strategy in solidarity, through a shared vision (Fairclough 2009). Such discourse, as a form of 
passive revolution, created a space and secured acceptance for transforming a perceived passive disability 
income support system, while maintaining traditional norms (Fairclough 2009). 
In espousing the fair go principle during this epoch, the pursuit of social justice becomes the cornerstone 
concept in establishing a shared approach: 
The vision is of a new system which more actively encourages independence for people 
with disabilities; a more humane system with better community understanding of basic 
human rights which apply equally to people with disabilities; a system with integrity, 
providing comprehensive assistance (Commonwealth of Australia 1989: 3264). 
  
This account captures the point at which social justice as a nebulous signifier communicates a need for 
egalitarianism while simultaneously introducing a push for individual self-reliance. Applied in official 
discourse, this grab-bag signifier allows for the the government to espouse the fairness of the disability 
pension. Such rhetoric helps to present the government as humanitarian and caring. The social justice 
discourse is used to inform the general public of economic and social benefits that will result if they invest 
in this vision (Fairclough 2009). The relationship between the public and people with a disability is touted 
as contributing to the good of all people, thereby using social justice discourse to make policy proposals 
ideologically desirable to the general public (Fairclough 2009). However, while social justice is 
represented as a universal right, it obscures the struggle with other social forces – such as global social 
forces. This discourse functions to conceal independence and self-reliance discourses, which in turn 
privilege ideals of economic rationalism – for example, those of productivity and labour market inclusion – 
as desirable aspirations. The contradiction demonstrates the dialectical relations of power and ideology, 
whereby the discourse invokes social justice while enabling economic ideals to contend for dominance and 
acceptance (Fairclough 2009). 
In situating the government’s values alongside social justice discourse, the parliamentary speech 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1989: 3264) communicates the interconnection between problem, authority, 
responsibility, and regulatory control, whereby Commonwealth authority is confined to economic 
considerations and intervention is circumscribed by compelling people with a disability to participate in 
society via employment opportunities. This claim of a socially just society further allows for the 
implementation of a compulsion mechanism in the disability pension regime. The assumption is made that 
society will benefit from people with a disability participating in employment, rather than languishing on 
disability income support (Cass et al. 1988: 61). In effect, that the ideals of social justice are at odds with 
the underpinning economic ideals of the policy, such as productivity and labour efficiency. Economic 
principles help to secure the logic of normalcy and function to reify the deficit model of disability by 
increasing the emphasis on individual dysfunction, rather than by exploring structural barriers to 
employment. 
In a complex way, generating opportunities for greater labour market participation was expected to 
transcend the established order and separate it from traditional responses: 
We linked these reforms to a reshaping and a clarification of the role of the Commonwealth 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991a: 788). 
This rhetorical device makes the response ideological in the sense that it seeks to employ an interpretation 
of Commonwealth authority and the disability pension regime that diverges from existing interpretation. 
New legislation superseded the Invalid Pension (Commonwealth of Australia 1991a; 1991b). While the 
new legislative and administrative framework, in the form of the Disability Support Package Legislation 
enacted in 1991 by the Keating Labor Government, marked a departure from previous epochs by 
reconstituting bureaucratic centralism, its Disability Support Pension continued to maintain the dominant 
hegemonic principles of conservative paternalism. As is evident in the following parliamentary speech, it 
espoused the virtues of the new legality in reducing long-term public expenditure on income support and 
lowering the perceived dependency levels on income support payments: 
The establishment of the new disability support pension …. [which constitutes] change not 
only in the name but also in the essential criteria for assessment of pensions for those with 
disabilities represents a very historic change. It is historic essentially because it throws the 
emphasis more on the capacities of people with disabilities than on their incapacities … that 
is, in the assessment of people for payments for social security, the level of impairment 
needs to be assessed (Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 2823). 
Conservative sanctioned paternalism was reinterpreted to mean a concern for enabling people with 
disabilities. The enabled active citizen discourse interacted with the new legality and accompanying 
institutional practices through rearticulating the eligibility criteria and adding a reciprocal requirement of 
obligation. If an individual with a disability was deemed capable of working up to 30 hours per week, they 
could receive the Disability Support Pension, yet they needed to fulfil other eligibility conditions 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991b). The assumption underpinning the reciprocal obligation principle was 
the expectation that disability pensioners had an obligation – in reality, a duty – to look for work 
  
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991a; 1991b). Reliance on the disability pension became even more 
synonymous with lacking the motivation to find employment. The enabled active citizen discourse was 
different from the invalid citizen discourse identified in previous epochs; the enabled active citizen 
discourse functioned to perpetuate the productive citizenship discourse as opposed to notions of social 
citizenship. 
Epoch four (1996–2007) the capable regulated and contributing citizen: a shift from 
invalid citizen, genuinely unemployed and active citizen discourses 
In epoch four, Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism operated in conjunction 
with a new combination of neoliberalism and conservatism to emphasise a greater minimalist approach to 
Commonwealth intervention in the provision of disability income support. The government sought to 
reframe the nature of the government–recipient relationship to one based on individual and contractual 
obligations in an ongoing effort to contain welfare expenditure (Fairclough 2009). While it could be 
argued that the erosion of Commonwealth responsibility but not authority and the rise in the notion of the 
active citizen that characterise the neoliberal turn occurred earlier than epoch four, the changes to disability 
income support policy in epoch four were in effect different from other epochs in that the policy approach 
was based on instigating even greater regulatory controls than in previous epochs, and in capturing the 
support of the general population. Epoch one relied on invalid citizen discourse, and epoch two 
represented the contrasting fair go and most needy / neoliberal discourse. Epoch three signified change 
through enabling policies, using the language of the enabled active citizen and social justice, whereas in 
epoch four, Commonwealth authority, neoliberalism and conservatism were used to form an 
intellectual/moral bloc (Fairclough 2009). 
In epoch four a distinct new legality gave rise to a more articulate, explicit and logical form of 
Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism than evident in previous epochs, and 
functioned to replace outmoded ideas of bureaucratic centralism. This new legality operated to erode the 
social protection-based framework of the disability income support system by promoting institutional 
innovation in the structural adjustment and reorganisation of the disability pension regime. 
The following text is indicative of this change, portraying the notion of entitlement as an outmoded norm: 
The social security system … does not have a sustained focus on helping people move 
beyond reliance on income support to self-sufficiency. Some parts of the system still create 
work … disincentives … it still does too little to prevent and discourage welfare 
dependency (Newman 2000: 6–7). 
Here, neoliberalism and conservatism find new expression in the depiction of a welfare state beset by an 
inefficient social security system. This discursive formation promotes the assumption that a more targeted 
and efficient system can benefit all citizens (Commonwealth of Australia 2002; 2005). The solution 
offered is stringent accountability measures and cost efficiencies obtained by tightening the disability 
pension eligibility criteria and implementing work requirements. Legitimacy was established through the 
use of another phrase: 
[The] government’s disciplined approach to fiscal policy (Newman 2000: 10). 
In reframing the argument for a modernist approach the government could establish divergent 
interpretations of Commonwealth authority and power through a new legality of disciplined economic 
policy: 
The maintenance of sound fiscal policy provides the underpinning for expansion in the 
Australian economy and is the basis for continued employment growth and economic 
security for all Australians. In short, good economic policy is good welfare policy 
(Newman 2000: 10). 
In securing legitimacy for the new policy position, the discursive formation in this statement suggests that 
the best approach to modern income support is economic management and good governance – efficiencies 
and accountabilities – as opposed to pursuing social objectives. From this position, a strong active income 
support system could be realised only by strengthening economic development, engaging in employment 
  
expansion, and providing incentives to work. Epoch four discourse suggested that good economic 
management deriving from a balance between government public policy and laissez-faire economics was 
essential for a strong economy. In making these claims of sound economic policy as a means of securing 
sustainable income support, the government negated the suggestion that there were similarities between 
past and present policies (Fairclough 2009). 
Consolidating this modernist approach relied upon the appropriation of certain policy principles 
traditionally associated with social democratic policy. The use of egalitarian language was evident in a 
speech by then Prime Minister Howard: 
We’re a Party that does not believe in privilege or class. We are a Party that honours and 
respects tradition but also prides itself in sharing the great egalitarian tradition of the 
Australian people (Howard 1999: 8). 
The notion of egalitarianism used here is at odds with the idea of giving back to society, as it suggests that 
democratic and equal participation is enjoyed by all citizens. Paradoxically, it also transforms the concept 
of egalitarianism to attribute primacy to the capable, regulated and contributing citizen: 
Just as it is an ongoing responsibility of government to support those in genuine need, so 
also is it the case that … those in receipt of such assistance should give something back to 
society in return, and in the process improve their own prospects for self-reliance (Howard 
1999: 8). 
This discursive formation establishes an unquestioned and assumed logical requirement that people with a 
disability reliant on disability income support will be economically productive citizens and contribute to 
society through work: in effect, productive citizenship. 
This conception of citizenship has functioned to restrict access to disability income support payments, now 
provided on the assumption that people in receipt of disability income support needed some form of 
regulatory control to prevent welfare dependency: 
This Government has reinforced Australia’s safety net, but we also believe in the principle 
of mutual obligation …. Far from undermining social protection, policies that promote 
responsible behaviour and self-reliance are essential pillars of a compassionate Australia 
(Howard 2006: 3). 
Although in part similar to previous epochs, the discourse of a compassionate nation was used to sell the 
idea of self-reliance, contribution, and the regulation of disabled citizen behaviour. However, unlike 
previous epochs, this change was reinforced through redefinition of the disability conception of permanent 
incapacity and work capacity to ‘partial capacity to work’. The new legislative framework was introduced 
in 2006. If assessed as capable of working 15 hours per week, the recipient is shifted to Newstart 
Allowance – which is lower in value than the disability pension – and required to undertake mutual 
obligation activities (Commonwealth of Australia 2005: 14). Figure 4 below depicts the novel 
interpretation of Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism in the regulation of the 
behaviour of particular groups, in which only those genuinely worthy of a pension or genuinely disabled 
are supported. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
The metaphors used in the cartoon highlight the disabling assumptions attached to the partial capacity to 
work criterion that reconstituted productive citizenship as an obligation, that is, productive citizenship 
through being an able contributing citizen, rather than based on social citizenship (Grover & Piggott 2010). 
Contemporary policy trajectory (2008–now) partial incapacity, active participation, 
and job-ready discourse 
Between 2007 and 2013 the incoming Labor Government under Prime Ministers Kevin Rudd and then 
Julia Gillard reflected yet another constriction of the targeting of disability income support. Discursive 
formations in parliamentary speeches of the time point to a continuity of the strong economy discourse 
  
while alluding to the tightening of disability income support through reforms. A parliamentary speech by 
then Prime Minister Gillard draws out the strong economy argument: 
The nation … is facing turbulent economic times. It is the intention of the government to 
manage the economy now, to keep the economy strong and also to enact the reforms today 
that we need to have to ensure that the economy is strong for the future (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2011: 8139). 
Similar to epoch four, in this epoch the government invokes impending crisis – for example, the need for a 
sustainable welfare system; burgeoning welfare costs – in order to garner legitimacy for transforming the 
disability pension regime. The discourse of crisis, seen in the phrase ‘facing turbulent economic times’ 
(line 1) and ‘reformist economics’, provides space for reinterpreting circumstances in the current 
established economic order, post-global financial crisis. Targeting is perceived to be an effective means for 
increasing workforce capacity, as seen in discourse pertaining to the Social Security and Other Legislation 
Amendment (Disability Support Participation Reforms) Bill 2012 (Cth): 
Currently, DSP recipients do not have to satisfy an activity test and / or participation 
requirements in order to qualify for payment as do other income support recipients … such 
as Newstart Allowance (NSA) recipients. This is a legacy of the fact that both the original 
IP, and its replacement DSP, have been targeted at persons with a significant inability to 
undertake work. The Budget initiatives which give rise to this Bill seek to impose 
participation requirements on some DSP recipients. They are targeting those younger 
recipients with some work capacity (Commonwealth of Australia 2012). 
In another significant change, 2013 reflected a new government in power following the election of the 
Liberal-National Coalition under Prime Minister Tony Abbott. There have been similar continuities, as 
with epoch four. For example, a speech by the Minister for Social Services contains rhetorical devices 
similar to those used in epoch four. In targeting the disability pension, yet another new interpretation of the 
partial incapacity, active participation, and job-ready language is found: 
The Government wants to ensure the welfare system encourages people to participate in 
work when they are of workforce age, and are able to do so, because the best form of 
welfare is a job and people are better off overall when they are active participants in our 
workforce. Recent decades have seen substantial economic and social changes in Australian 
society; the structure of the economy and the labour market has changed, with unskilled 
work becoming increasingly scarce relative to skilled work which requires higher levels of 
education and training. Societal norms have changed in relation to the workforce 
participation of … people with disability and the needs of carers. Therefore, it is important 
that we have the right balance of maximising incentives for workforce participation and 
self-provision while ensuring the adequacy of the safety net at the same time. And it is 
important for the welfare system to remain socially sustainable and enable people to fully 
participate in society; the system must ensure that people who receive welfare payments 
and are able to work are supported to do so (Andrews 2014). 
Here each contention is constructed as universally desirable, logically consequential, and ideal, equating 
what the government wants with what ‘is important’. Conjunction of the government’s desires with those 
of Australian citizens amounts to what is ‘socially sustainable’ for the welfare system, resulting in the 
imperative that the system ‘support’ those able to work. It is clear from preceding references to ‘workforce 
participation’ and ‘self-provision’ that these ideals now constitute the measures of sustainability – both for 
the system and for society. As with epoch four, in this epoch, similar rhetorical devices are being used to 
recontextualise Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism with even tighter 
targeting measures and eligibility requirements – for example, use of the phrase ‘the best form of welfare 
is a job’ (line 3). Worthiness discourse is in part a continuity from epoch four, whereby the policy 
trajectory is driven by minimalist intervention discourse and neoliberalism. Although the phrase ‘the best 
form of welfare is a job’ echoes the discourse in epoch four, in this epoch the terms ‘modern’, ‘good fiscal 
policy’ and ‘egalitarianism’ are no longer used to gain support for increased restrictions. The discourse is 
recontextualised to position Australia within the context of global economics while simultaneously 
allowing space for reinterpretation of the Australian economic situation post-global financial crisis. This 
discursive space then allows for changes that suggest the need for a Commonwealth authority newly 
  
reconstituted through strong economic intervention and even tighter controls by the government in power. 
Partial capacity is similarly transformed into the notion of temporary disability. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The idea of an income support approach based on social citizenship and non-disablist principles is 
significant. Disablism is entrenched within the Australian disability income support system through the 
ideologies of Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism and coercion. The 
Australian disability income support system is disabling in nature, and has been from its inception. The 
reinterpretation and entrenchment of the Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned 
paternalism ideologies over time contributed to the generation of inequities within the disability income 
support system, and hence to the vulnerability of people with a disability who rely on disability pensions. 
Over time there has been a continuity of themes such as incentives, productivity, the concern over idleness, 
and whether a recipient is deserving of a pension. However, across each epoch a new interpretation and 
reconstitution of Commonwealth authority and conservative sanctioned paternalism has resulted in a new 
legality that leads to the Australian disability income support system functioning to limit the social 
citizenship of recipients, thereby forming part of the disablement process. This article illustrates the way 
complex interactions – legislative frameworks, discourses and practices – have functioned to restrict the 
social citizenship of disability pensioners and promote notions of productive citizenship. This suggests that 
disablism has permeated across the epochs relatively unchallenged and unchanged. The Australian 
disability income support system generates categories on the basis of ‘ableness’ as a condition of 
citizenship. Government discourses and ideological practices have reconstituted the nature of the 
relationship between people with disabilities and the government. Over time the rights of disability 
pensioners have become narrowly prescribed, often overly restricted by conditions requiring the recipient 
to work. Essentially, this has become a unilateral contractual relationship on the part of the government in 
power. Tighter targeting has perpetuated disablism and operated to marginalise people with disabilities. 
An income support system designed to assist people with a disability underpinned by non-disablist 
principles such as social citizenship would help to disrupt the ideology of disablism in disability policy and 
provide disabled citizens with a fair go.  
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Figures 
Figure 1. ‘Blind Beggar’, Melbourne, Victoria (circa 1880–1900) 
 
 
Source: Unknown Creator (circa 1880–1900) and reproduced courtesy of Vision Australia Heritage 
Collection, accessed 15 January 2008, http://www.visionaustralia.org.au/info.aspx 
  
  
Figure 2. ‘We pay the dole only to those genuinely looking for jobs’ (Malcolm Fraser, Ian Viner) 
 
Source: Pryor, Geoff (1979) and reproduced courtesy of National Library of Australia, accessed 20 
January 2008, http://www.nla.gov.au/pict/pic 
 
  
  
Figure 3. Paul Keating receiving a medal for 1.2% inflation while riding on the back of the 
unemployed 
 
  
Source: Pryor, Geoff (1992) and reproduced courtesy of National Library of Australia, accessed 20 
January 2008, http://www.nla.gov.au/pict/pic 
 
  
  
Figure 4. Disability Pension Crackdown in The Australian, April 19, 2005 
 
 
Source: Nicholson (2005) and reproduced with permission, accessed 20 January 2008, 
http://www.nicholsoncartoons.com.au 
 
 
 
